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Abstract
In this note we model the individual decision on income underreporting in a system with a
negative income tax. We show that a change in the tax rate has opposing effects on the
compliance behavior of the poor and the rich.
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URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2008/volume8/EB-08H20001A.pdfEconomists have studied many aspects of tax evasion.1 We consider non-compliance in an econ-
omy with a liner negative income tax (NIT). Thereby, we address a further aspect of cheating
on the state, namely beneﬁt fraud. This oﬀense has gained relatively modest attention in the
economic literature so far. This fact is surprising since there is a widespread concern with mini-
mizing abuse and dishonesty in social welfare and health care programmes. Employing a simple
model of choice under uncertainty in the spirit of the traditional tax evasion literature (Alling-
ham and Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1974) we show that a changing tax rate has opposing eﬀects
on the compliance behavior of citizens below versus above the tax threshold.
Consider an economy with a threshold for positive tax liabilities ¯ W > 0. A citizen with an
exogenous income W < ¯ W is eligible for beneﬁts. He gets subsidized by the state by the amount
of θ( ¯ W − W) where θ ∈ [0,1]. If a citizen’s income is higher than ¯ W he has to pay taxes
in the amount of θ(W − ¯ W). If W is equal to ¯ W the citizen’s net income is equal to his gross
income. Since the true gross income is known by the citizen but not observable by the government
without cost, the citizen is asked to declare it. We denote this declared amount by D ∈ [0,W].
Irrespective of the amount of the citizen’s income he has an incentive to underreport, either
to pay lower taxes or to receive (higher) beneﬁts. The state’s enforcement policy is to audit a
fraction ρ of the population. In the event of an audit, the state reveals the true income W.
We can now distinguish two basic cases of non-compliance: (i) If citizen i, with a gross income
Wi below the threshold income chooses to declare an amount Di where ¯ W > Wi > Di he will
commit beneﬁt fraud, (ii) If another citizen j earning a gross income Wj above the threshold
income reports an amount Dj where Wj > Dj > ¯ W he will perpetrate tax evasion.2 In any
case we assume that if income understatement is detected by the state a dishonest citizen must
repay the beneﬁts obtained by fraud or the evaded taxes θ(W − D). In addition he has to pay
a penalty based on the tax understatement where the penalty rate λ > 1. Therefore, we follow
Yitzhaki (1974) and presume that the penalty depends on the tax understatement, compared to
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) who deﬁne a penalty depending on the income understatement.
Each convicted citizen suﬀers also from stigmatization where stigma cost increase with the tax
understatement at rate s.
There are two possible states of the world, ‘audit’ and ‘no audit’. We denote the citizen’s available
income in the ﬁrst case by IA and in the latter case by INA. The citizen’s aim is to choose D to
maximize a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, E[U] = (1 − ρ)U[INA] + ρU[IA], where
we assume that U0[·] > and U00[·] < 0. The ﬁrst- and second order condition are as follows:
∂E[U]
∂D
= (ρ − 1)U0[INA] + ρ(s + λ − 1)U0[IA] ≤ 0,D
∂E[U]
∂D









Proposition 1: Under the special case of constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) an increase
in the tax rate has an unambiguous positive eﬀect on compliance behavior in the context of tax
evasion as well in the context of beneﬁt fraud. While, if preferences exhibit decreasing absolute
risk aversion (DARA) income understatement is unambiguously decreasing with the tax rate θ in
the context of tax evasion, but the eﬀect on compliance behavior in the context of beneﬁt fraud is
ambiguous. Conversely, if preferences exhibit increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA) income
understatement is unambiguously decreasing with the tax rate θ in the context of beneﬁt fraud,
but the sign of the eﬀect is ambiguous in the context of tax evasion.3
1The development of the literature is surveyed by Cowell (1990).
2In principal, there is a further case: If this citizen j chooses to report an amount D
0
j where Wj > ¯ W > D
0
j he
would commit both beneﬁt fraud and tax evasion.
3Note, income understatement is strictly decreasing in the probability of detection ρ, in the ﬁne rate λ and






∂s are unambiguously positive. These comparative static
eﬀects are identical in both contexts.
1Proof of Proposition 1: Consider a regular interior optimum (D∗ < W). By implicit diﬀer-




(1 − ¯ ρ)U0[INA]
−S

(D − ¯ W)(AR[IA] − AR[INA]) + (s + λ)(W − D)AR[IA]
	
, (3)
where AR[·] ≡ −U00[·]/U0[·] is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. To determine
the sign of ∂D∗
∂θ we check the sign of the term in curly brackets and deﬁne Υ ≡
AR[IA]−AR[INA]
AR[IA] .
If the following condition holds,  
D − ¯ W

(D − W)
Υ < (s + λ), (4)
the term in curly brackets is positive and ∂D∗
∂θ > 0 is true. However, if
 
D − ¯ W

(D − W)
Υ > (s + λ) (5)
is fulﬁlled, the term in curly brackets is negative and ∂D∗
∂θ < 0 holds. In the context of tax evasion
 
D∗ > ¯ W

0 < D− ¯ W
D−W < 1, while in the context of beneﬁt fraud
 
D∗ < ¯ W
 D− ¯ W
D−W > 1. Under
the assumption of CARA (Υ = 0), condition (4) is always fulﬁlled since s + λ is by deﬁnition
greater than one and ∂D∗
∂θ > 0 holds unambiguously in each context. Under the assumption of
DARA (0 < Υ < 1) condition (4) is always fulﬁlled in the context of tax evasion and ∂D∗
∂θ > 0. In
the context of beneﬁt fraud the sign is ambiguous. Conversely, under the assumption of IARA
(Υ < 0) condition (4) is always fulﬁlled in the context of beneﬁt fraud and ∂D∗
∂θ > 0. While in
the context of tax evasion the sign is ambiguous. 
In general, a change in the tax rate has both an income and a substitution eﬀect. Since we
follow Yitzhaki (1974) and assume that the penalty is related to the tax understatement and the
beneﬁt overstatement respectively, there is no substitution eﬀect. In the context of tax evasion
an increase in tax rate is equivalent to an income reduction, and given that the citizen has DARA
switching to a less risky position is optimal. As a result an increasing tax rate decreases tax
evasion. This result is analogous to Yitzhaki (1974). However, in the context of beneﬁt fraud an
increase in tax rate is equivalent to an income increase, and switching to a less risky position is
only optimal if citizens have IARA.
Notwithstanding, this neglected discrepancy has an insightful policy implication. Under the
assumption of DARA an increase in the tax rate unambiguously improves compliance behavior of
citizens with an income above the threshold (the ‘rich’). The eﬀect on the citizens with an income
below the threshold (the ‘poor’) is ambiguous. Conditioning on (5) we observe an opposing
eﬀect and compliance behavior of the poor deteriorates. Conversely, if citizens exhibit IARA, an
increasing tax rate unambiguously improves compliance of the poor. However, conditioning on
(5), it deteriorates the compliance of the rich. Therefore, under a system of NIT the state has
to note that a change in the tax rate has potential opposing eﬀects on the compliance behavior
of the poor and the rich.
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